International Law Studies—Volume 53
THE LAW OF THE SEA:
SOME RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
(With Particular Reference to the United Nations
Conference of 1958)
Carl M. Franklin (Author)

The thoughts and opinions expressed are those of the authors and not necessarily of the U.S.
Government, the U.S. Department of the Navy or the Naval War College.

CHAPTER V

HIGH SEAS PROBLEM SITUATIONS
A. PROBLEM I: Right to Board and Inspect a Foreign Vessel on
the High Seas Thought To Be Guilty of Damaging Transatlantic
Cables

The facts and several of the issues of this problem-an actual
case-are set forth in an exchange of notes between the United States
and the Soviet Union during February and March, 1959. (See
below.) In reading this exchange of notes it will be well to keep
in mind certain pertinent provisions of the 1958 Geneva Convention
on the High Seas,t which had been signed by both the United States
and the U.S.S.R. prior to the incident. 2
Article 2 of the Convention on the High Seas enumerates, among
others, the freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines. The article
also includes a corollary duty in providing that this freedom (as well
as the others which are enumerated and additional ones required by
international law) "shall be exercised by all States with reasonable
regard to the interests of other States in their excercise of the freedom of the high seas." 3 The essence of this provision is that each
user of the high seas must accommodate every other user in order to
have the least possible interference among all users commensurate
with the maximum utilization o£ the high seas.
Hence, the article provides for certain enumerated rights (i.e.,
"freedoms") on the high seas, both for coastal and non-coastal states,
and at the same time expresses a general duty or obligation of each
state which exercises those rights to be reasonable in doing so.
Reasonableness in the context of the problem situation here, involving
damage to five submarine cables by a trawler, means that in exercising
its right to fish in the high seas, the fishing vessel must not wilfully or
negligently damage the cables. This is the minimum standard of
duty to which the trawler may be held, and it should be noted that
Article II of the 1884 Convention For the Protection of Submarine
1

U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 13/L. 53 and corr. 1 (1958).
See Appendix J, p. 264. Although both states have signed the Convention
on the High Seas, neither had ratified it at the time of the incident.
3
See Appendix B for a complete text of the Cgnvention on the High Seas.
2
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Cables 4 to which both the United States and the U.S.SR. are parties,
expressly establishes this duty by making a wilful or culpably negligent damage to the submarine cable a punishable offense. 5
Articles 26 to 29, inclusive, of the Convention on the High Seas also
contain provisions relating to submarine cables which should be kept
in mind in analyzing the exchange of notes between the United States
and the Soviet Government:
"ARTICLE

26

"1. All States shall be entitled to lay submarine cables and
pipelines on the bed of the high seas.
"2. Subject to its right to take reasonable measures for the
exploration of the continental shelf and the exploitation of its
natural resources, the coastal State may not impede the laying
or maintenance of such cables or pipelines.
"3. When laying such cables or pipelines the State in question shall pay due regard to cables or pipelines already in
position on the seabed. In particular, possibilities of repairing existing cables or pipelines shall not be prejudiced.
"ARTICLE

27

"Every State shall take the necessary legislative measures
to provide that the breaking or injury by a ship flying its
flag or by a person subject to its jurisdiction of a submarine
cable beneath the high seas done wilfully or through culpable
negligence, in such a manner as to be liable to interrupt or
obstruct telegraphic or telephonic communications, and similarly the breaking or injury of a submarine pipeline or highvoltage power cable shall be a punishable offence. This
provision shall not apply to any break or injury caused by
persons who acted merely with the legitimate object of saving
their lives or their ships, after having taken all necessary
precautions to avoid such break or injury.
"ARTICLE

28

"Every State shall take the necessary legislative measures
to provide that, if persons subject to its jurisdiction who are
the owners of a cable or pipeline beneath the high seas, in
laying or repairing that cable or pipeline, cause a break in or
injury to another cable or pipeline, they shall bear the cost
of the repairs.
'24 Stat. 989, 25 Stat. 142'!. For the text of the pertinent sections of the
Convention for the Protection of Submarine Cables (1884), see infra, p. 165.
5
Ibid., at Art. II.
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"ARTICLE

29

"Every State shall take the necessary legislative measures
to ensure that the owners of ships who can prove that they
have sacrificed an anchor, a net or any other fishing gear, in
order to avoid injuring a submarine cable or pipeline, shall
be inden1nified by the owner of the cable or pipeline, provided that the owner of the ship has taken all reasonable
precautionary measures beforehand."

EXCHANGE OF NOTES BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND
SOVIET GOVERNMENT ON DAMAGE TO SUBMARINE
CABLES FROM FEBRUARY 21 TO 25, 1959 6
U.S. Aide Memoire of February 28, 1959
The Embassy of the United States of America has been instructed
to inform the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics of the following :
Between February 21-25, 1959, four telegraph and one voice transatlantic cables were damaged and put out of service. Aerial investigation disclosed that the Soviet trawler NOVOROSSIISI{ No.
RT-99 was in the area of these cable difficulties.
In accordance with the "Convention for Protection of Submarine
Cables" of 1884, to which the Soviet Union and the United States are
parties, a U.S. naval vessel put a visiting party on board the
NOVOROSSIISK on February 26 to investigate v1hether the trawler
had violated the Convention.
After discussion with the Trawler Captain and examination of the
log, the boarding officer from the U.S.S. R. 0. HALE made an
appropriate entry in the journal of the trawler as required by Article
X of the Convention and the visiting party left the vessel. The
tra,vler's log indicated that the ship had been in the area o£ cable
damage at the time of the last service interruption. It is understood
that the trawler proceeded on its way without delay.
A cable repair ship is en route to the area of cabJe damage for final
investigation and repair.
Soviet Note of March 4, 1959
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs refers to the aide memoire of the
United States Embassy of February 28 concerning the detention and
inspection of the Soviet trawler NOVOROSSIISK on February 26
by an American vessel and considers it necessary to declare the
following:
6

State Dept. Bull. Vol. XL No.1034, pp. 555-558, (April20, 1959).
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According to information available to competent Soviet
organs, the Soviet trawler NOVOROSSIISK was engaged
in fishing in the open sea in the Northern Atlantic Ocean and
caused no damage of any kind to the underwater telegraph
or telephone Trans-Atlantic cables. Reports concerning this
question appearing in the American press are figments of
the imagination.
Consequently, the American naval vessel R. 0. HALE had
no reason for detaining and inspecting the aforementioned
Soviet trawler. Attention must be called to the :fact that
these actions of the American authorities were undertaken
specifically ·with respect to a Soviet vessel at a time in the
region of Newfoundland when there were hundreds of vessels from other countries engaged in fishing and, as reported,
many of which have more than once damaged TransAtlantic cables.
The Soviet Government cannot ignore the fact that in
connection "\vith the above-indicated actions of the United
States authorities numerous reports have appeared in the
American press containing various anti-Soviet :fabrications
concerning the purpose of the presence of a Soviet fishing
vessel in this region. These articles in the American press
are of such a kind that the impression is unavoidable that all
this venture with the detention of the Soviet trawler was
undertaken with provocative purposes. Not the least among
these purposes is an attempt to strain Soviet-American relations. It is impossible in this connection not to draw attention to the responsibility which the American Government
takes upon itself by taking such steps.
The Soviet Govern1nent protests against the detention and
inspection of the Soviet fishing trawler NOVOROSSIISK
by the American naval vessel and anticipates that the Government of the United States will take all necessary measures
to prevent further such completely unjustified actions with
respect to Soviet fishing vessels engaged in the fishing trade
in waters of the open sea.

U.S. Note of March 23, 1959
The Embassy of the United States of America refers to the Ministry's note No. 17/OSA, dated March 4, 1959 concerning recent breaks
in certain transatlantic submarine tele-communication cables and the
consequent visit to the Soviet trawler NOVOROSSIISI( by a boarding party of the U.S.S. ROY 0. HALE, which was the subject of
the Embassy's aide memoire of February 28, 1959.
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The Ministry's note states in substance that the Government of the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics ( 1) in accordance with information available to it denies that the Soviet trawler NOVOROSSIISI{
'vas responsible for the reported breaks in the transatlantic submarine cables; (2) that in its opinion the United States naval vessel
U.S.S. ROY 0. HALE had no reason to detain and inspect the
Soviet trawler NOVOROSSIISK; and (3) that based on articles
which have appeared in the American press concerning the purpose
of the presence of a Soviet fishing vessel in this region the detention of the Soviet trawler was undertaken with "provocative purposes." The note concludes that "The Soviet Government protests
against the detention and inspection of the Soviet fishing trawler
NOVOROSSIISK by the American naval vessel and anticipates
that the Government of the United States will take all necessary
measures to prevent :further such completely unjustified actions with
respect to Soviet fishing vessels engaged in the fishing trade in waters
of the open sea. "
For the reasons set out hereinafter the United States Government
considers there is no basis for a protest in this case and the Soviet
protest is therefore rejected. Furthermore, the United States Government is surprised that the Soviet Government should make a
charge that the detention of the Soviet trawler was for "provocative
purposes" with no other basis than apparent irritation at articles in
American newspapers speculating on the purposes of Soviet trawlers
in certain waters. As the Soviet Government well knows, the American press is free within legal limits to publish its opinions and these
do not engage the responsibility of the Government. Charges based
on such flimsy support are not themselves calculated to further
friendly relations.
The facts of the matter are as follows.·
During the period February 21 through February 25, 1959, communications were disrupted by damage to five transatlantic cables in
the Newfoundland area located within a rectangle bounded by the
following coordinates:
latitude
latitude
latitude
latitude

49°24' N., longitude 50°12' W.;
49°32' N., longitude 49°48' ,V.;
50°13' N., longitude 51 °00' W.;
50°22' N., longitude 50°36' W.

The first break occurred on February 21, 1959, at 10 :43 a.m., eastern standard time, in the transatlantic cable owned and operated in
part jointly with a Canadian company by the American Telephone
and Telegraph Company, a United States corporation having its
head office at New York, New York. The cable has its west terminus
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in Newfoundland and the east terminus in Scotland, and it ultimately
connected with the United States of America by submarine cable and
radio relay.
The second break occurred on February 24, 1959, at 2 :20 p.m.,
eastern standard time, in the transatlantic cable 1-VA, connecting
Newfoundland and Ireland. The third break occurred on February 25
at 2 :50 a.m., eastern standard time, in the transatlantic cable 3-PZ
connecting Newfoundland and England. The fourth cable break
occurred on February 25 at 11 :20 a.m., eastern standard time, in
cable 2-VA connecting Newfoundland with Ireland. The fifth break
occurred on February 25 at 4 :20 p.m., eastern standard time, in the
transatlantic cable 4-PZ connecting Newfoundland and England.
These four submarine cables connect ultimately with the United
States, and are owned and operated by the Western Union Telegraph
Company, a United States corporation with its head office at New
York, New York.
Subsequent examination showed that there were a total of twelve
breaks in the five cables. Nine of these were tension breaks and three
were man-made cuts severing the cables.
Aerial observation conducted by the American Telephone and Telegraph Company sighted the Soviet trawler NOVOROSSIISK
RT-99 on the morning of February 25, 1959, in the approximate
position latitude 49°34' N. and longitude 50°00' W., steaming on a
southerly course at a speed of about three knots. No other vessels
were visible at the time in the immediate vicinity. The aircraft succeeded in dropping a note on the deck of the trawler NOVOROSSIISK advising that it cease trawling in the area.
The Government of the United States, acting under the provisions
of Article X of the Convention for the Protection of Submarine Cables, of 1884, to which both the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics adhere, and also in conformity with United
States law ( 47 United States Code, Section 26), implementing the
convention, on February 25, 1959, dispatched the United States radar
picket escort U.S.S. ROY 0. HALE to the area to investigate the reported breaks in the submarine cables. On February 26, 1959, about
11 :55 a.m., eastern standard time, the Commander of the U.S.S. ROY
0. HALE sent a party consisting of one officer and four enlisted men,
without arms, aboard the Soviet trawler NOVOROSSIISI(. At the
time of the visit the trawler was in position latitude 48°26' N., longitude 49°10' W. There were no other ships in the inunediate vicinity.
The last four cable breaks referred to above were all located within
14 miles of each other and were each \vithin a 12-mile radius of the
observed position of the trawler NOVOROSSIISK on February 25,
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1959, with the nearest two breaks no more than five miles distant.
The five reported cable breaks all occurred within a radius of 52 miles
of one another. (All references are to nautical miles.) A line joining- the last four reported positions of the breaks is a straight line with
the breaks occurring in succession in the direction of approximately
160° T. A vessel in that vicinity trawling in a general southerly direction during the period in question would have been in the locations
necessary to cause the breaks.
The boarding officer, communicating by means of French throug-h
an interpreter, duly informed and explained to the master of the trawler NOVOROSSIISK the purpose of his visit and his authority to do
so under the provisions of the convention of 1884. He examined, with
the consent and acquiescence of the master, the papers of the trawler
which appeared to be in order.
The boarding officer found that the latitude and longitude which the
trawler NOVOROSSIISK recorded in her journal for the previous
days' positions also showed her to have been in the immediate vicinity
of all five cable breaks. Upon request, the master produced the message dropped on the deck of the trawler on the previous day from
the aircraft of the American Telephone and Telegraph Company.
On the basis of the foregoing evidence, the boarding officer concluded
that an examination of the fishing gear and equipment was justified
to determine whether the trawler was capable of causing the cable
breaks.
The unarmed boarding officer, with the consent of the master of the
trawler, observed without deep examination, on the upper deck of the
trawler only, the trawling equipment and fishing gear. The boarding officer noted that the trawling equipment was of the type for deep
sea fishing, and was in general fairly new, with the exception of the
otter boards and net discs which were well worn and in poor condition.
The trawling cable was estimated to be a bout 300 fathoms in length,
sufficiently long enough to drag the gear on the bottom at the depth in
the area-about 180 fathoms. Two broken sections of trawling cable
each about 60 feet in length were observed wrapped around the hatch
on deck. The four ends of these cables were shredded and frayed and
appeared to have parted as a result of a sudden strain such as could
have been caused by snagging the gear. These sections are identical
in type, age, and condition with the trawling cable. Some of the fish
observed lying frozen on deck were of the bottom type.
The visit on board the trawler lasted about 70 minutes, and was
completed at 1 :05 p.m., eastern standard time. At the time of his departure the boarding officer made the following entry in the trawler's
journal:
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1355-The NOVOROSSIISK (RT-99) motor vessel this date
has been visited by me at Longitude 49°10' vV., Latitude 48°26'
N., and at 1355 (time+3) 26 February 1959. I have examined
the ship papers and :found them to appear regular, but the presence of a message drop regarding cut "submarine" cables signed
by Capt. R. Cooper, A/C OF-CPR indicated further investigation of fishing equipment required. All papers sighted bear my
signature. The Captain consented to such further inspection but
appeared dubious of the number of men to inspeci.
/s/ D. M. SHEELY
Lt., U.S. Navy
1440-Completed Inspection and departed.
/s/ D. M. SHEELY
LT., U.S. Navy
A preliminary report emanating from the cable repair ship LORD
KELVIN which has since repaired the first broken cable states that
the eastern portion of the damaged cable had been badly scraped
and scuffed for about a mile east of the break. The cable had been
severed by cutting. The technical opinion is that such evidence indicates that a trawler had picked up the cable with its drag, then having
pulled it on deck, had cut it to release the nets.
The protection of submarine telecommunications cables on the high
seas constitutes an international obligation. The locations and presence of the transatlantic submarine cables that have been cut are
widely known among world fishing and maritime circles. They are
shown and marked on United States admiralty and navigation maps
which are available to the general public.
The above-stated record of events shows that, contrary to the assertions and charges made in the above-mentioned note of the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics, the visit to the Soviet trawler NOVOROSSIISI{ under the circumstances shown was entirely justified and was
in every respect in accordance with international law and applicable
treaty provisions.
The Government of the United States is satisfied that the evidence
in its possession raises a stJ'ong presumption that the master and crew
of the Soviet trawler NOVOROSSIISK have violated Article II of
the convention of 1884 above-mentioned which provides that "the
breaking or injury of a submarine cable, done wilfully or through
culpable negligence, and resulting in the total or partial interruption"
of telegraphic communication shall be a punishable offense.
Article VIII et seq. of the convention place the responsibility for
the repression of these violations of the convention and trial and
punishment of the violators on the Soviet Union. Therefore, the
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Government of the United States calls upon the Government of the
Union of Soviet Socia1ist Republics to discharge its international obligations as summarily as its laws and regulations will permit, by
promptly making such investigations and taking such measures as
are necessary to punish those who may be found to be guilty.
The Government of the United States reserves the right to make
such claims for damages as may be found to be warranted.
The Government of the United States further expeets that the
Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will take
effective measures to prevent Soviet fishing trawlers on the high
seas from damaging or cutting submarine cables in the future.
The Government of the United States further states that it will
continue to fulfill its international obligations with regard to the protection of submarine cables.

CONVENTION FOR PROTECTION OF SUBMARINE CABLES
(1884)
ARTICLE I
The present Convention shall be applicable, outside of the territorial
waters, to all legally established submarine cables landed in the territories, colonies or possessions of one or more of the High Contracting Parties.
ARTICLE II
The breaking or injury of a submarine cable, done wilfully or
through culpable negligence, and resulting in the total or partial
interruption or embarrassment of telegraphic communications, shall
be a punishable offense, but the punishment inflicted shall be no bar
to a civil action for damages.
This provision shall not apply to ruptures or injuries when the
parties guilty thereof have become so simply with legitimate object
of saving their lives or their vessels, after having taken all necessary
precautions to avoid such ruptures or injuries.

***

ARTICLE VIII _

The courts competent to take cognizance of infraction of this convention shall be those of the country to which the vessel on board of
which the infraction has been committed belongs.
It is, moreover, understood that, in cases in which the provision
contained in the foregoing paragraph cannot be carried out, the
repression of violations of this convention_shall take place, in each
of the contracting States, in the case of its subjects or citizens, in
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accordance with the general rules of penal competence established by
the special laws of those States, or by international treaties.

***

ARTICLE X

Evidence of violations of this convention may be obtained by all
methods of securing proof that are allowed by tl1e laws of the country
of the court before which a case has been brought.
When the officers commanding the vessels of war or the vessels
specially commissioned for that purpose, of one of the High Contracting Parties, shall have reason to believe that an infraction of
the measures provided for by this Convention has been committed
by a vessel other than a vessel of war, they may require the captain
or master to exhibit the official documents furnishing evidence of the
nationality of the said vessel. Summary mention of such exhibition
shall at once be made on the documents exhibited.
Reports may, moreover, be prepared by the said officers, whatever
may be the nationality of the inculpated vessel. These reports shall
be drawn up in the form and in the language in use in the country
to which the officer drawing them up belongs; they may be used as
evidence in the country in which they shall be invoked, and according
to the laws of such country. The accused parties and the witnesses
shall have the right to add or to cause to be added thereto, in their
own language any explanations that they may deem proper; these
declarations shall be duly signed.
ARTICLE XI
Proceedings and trial in cases of infractions of the provisions of
this Convention shall always take place as summarily as the laws and
regulations in force will permit.
ARTICLE XII
The High Contracting Parties engage to take or to propose to their
respective legislative bodies the measures necessary in order to secure
the execution of this Convention, and especially in order to cause the
punishment, either by fine or imprisonment, or both, of such persons
as may violate the provisions of articles II, V and VI.
The international law questions involved in this problem are as
follow: 7
7

In analyzing this problem the following references will be helpful, IV
Hackworth, Digest of International Law 243-247 ( 1940-44) ; Higgins and Colombos, International Law of the Sea 38, 262-264, 298-302; (2nd Rev. ed. 1950).
I Hyde, International Law Ohiefty as Interpreted and Applied by the United
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1. Does a state with either publicly or privately owned submarine

cables have the right to board and inspect a foreign vessel on the high
seas when that vessel is thought to be guilty of damaging the cables
either by intentional or culpably negligent action~
2. If a state has the right to board and inspect a foreign vessel
under the above circumstances, does the right exist :
(a) Because both states are parties to the Convention for the
Protection of Submarine. Cables ( 1884) ; or
(h) Because customary international law has developed from the
1884 Convention and/or from general state practice so that the right
of the aggrieved state (and the corollary duty of the injuring state)
"\vould exist even though one (or both) of the states was not a party
to the 1884 Convention; or
(c) Because the states are parties to the 1958 Geneva Convention
on the High Seas~
Subsidiary questions will be discussed in connection with the basic
questions above, such as:
1. May a convention be interpreted in such manner as to accord
the right to board and inspect a foreign vessel on the high seas when
provisions of the convention do not expressly grant this right~
2. Does the 1884 Convention, customary international law, or the
1958 Geneva c·onvention give the right to an injured state to board
a foreign war vessel, a foreign merchant or fishing vessel which is
publicly owned; or only a foreign merchant or fishing vessel which
is privately owned~
3. Is the Soviet Government bound by the provisions of the 1884
Convention which were signed by Czarist Russia, a predecessor
government ~
Q. I. Does a state with either publicly or privately owned submarine cables have the right to board and inspect a foreign vessel
on the high seas when that vessel is thought to be guilty of damaging
the cables either by intentional or culpably negligent action~
International law, no less than other law, comes into existence to
permit the world community of states to achieve certain values, among
"\V hich is the protection against wrongful destruction of devices of
communication owned by a state or the citizens thereof. Principles
are formulated and rules promulgated unilaterally by states and
accepted, modified, or rejected by other states with the result that
eventually a body of commonly accepted principles and rules of cusState8 1-20, 693-695, 751-753, (1945) ; I Lauterpacht-Oppenheim, International
Law, 587-626 (8th ed. 1957) ; II Malloy, Treatie~, Convention8, International
Act8, Protocol8 and Agreement8 Between the United State8 and Other Power8,
1776-1909, 1949"-1957 (1910 ed).
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tomary international law develop. In other instances, these established principles and rules, or totally new ones, are embodied in conventions signed and ratified by a number of states which are bound
thereby. If the conventions codify customary international law
then the principles and rules are binding upon all states, whether
signatory to the convention or not.
The 1958 Convention on the High Seas, which the delegates from
86 states at the Geneva Conference (or at least the delegates from
the 65 states voting for the Convention) 8 agreed was ·codifying the
rules of international law relating to the high seas, provides in Article 2 for a number o£ freedoms, including both "freedom of fishing"
and "freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines." 9
The first question therefore may be rephrased as follows: If a state
(Soviet Union) in the exercise of her acknowledged right to fish
on the high seas interferes with and causes damage to the property
of nationals of another state (United States) in the exercise of her
equally valid right to hiy, operate and maintain submarine cables,
which right, if either, shall prevail over the other and what duties
does each state owe to the other to safeguard the other's interests and
righ ts.~
In this problem situation both the United States and the Soviet
Union are inclusive users of a common resource-the high seas.
But generally speaking, a right to the free use of the high seas is
not absolute in the sense that other users may be disregarded, endangered, impeded or excluded. Indeed, the 1958 Convention on the
High Seas specifically provides that the freedoms enumerated, and
others which are recognized by the general principies of international law, "shall be exercised by all States with reasonable regard
to the interests of other States in their exercise of the freedom of the
high seas." 10 (emphasis added)
Therefore, although a Soviet trawler may fish in the high seas, it
may not do so in a manner which endangers or interferes unreasonably with the right of the United States to operate and maintain
her sub1narine cables. Later we shall note and discuss certain specific
provisions of both the 1884 Convention and the 1958 Geneva Convention in relation to rights of the cable state and the corollary duties
of the fishing state.
First, let us review briefly the history of submarine cables in rela,tion to the problem at hand. When the first submarine cables were
laid in 1851 it was only natural that states became concerned with
0

8

2 Official Records (A/CONF. 13/38, 61 (1958)).
U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 13/L.53 and corr. 1, Art. 2 (2)-(3), (1958).
10
Ibid., at Art. 2, par. 2.
9
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the need for their protection. One theory advanced as a possible basis
for such protection was that the doctrine of piracy, which permitted
search and seizure of offending persons and vessels, could be extended
to instances of willful damage to cables. A convention was proposed
which would have embodied this concept, but it did not materialize.
Later, an international agreement was recommended and after protracted discussions, including rejection of the assimilation of the
piracy doctrine to the destruction of cables, an international conference resulted in the Paris Convention of 1884. The United States and
the Soviet Union are parties to this Convention.
Although the right to board and inspect a foreign vessel on the
high seas is not specifically provided for in the 1884 Convention, the
provisions of Article X of the Convention clearly contemplate such
action. Article X provides in part,
"Evidence of violations of this convention may be obtained
by all methods of securing proof that are allowed by the laws
of the country of the court before which a case has been
brought." 11
Hence an injured state may use reasonable ~ means to secure evidence of damages to its cables. Reasonable means would, of necessity,
include the right to board and inspect the suspected vessel because in
many instances it would not be possible to make a reasonably conclusive determination of the cause of the damage without such boarding and inspection.
The facts at hand prior to the boarding of the Soviet vessel reasonably supported the presumption that the breaks in the cables had
resulted from the trawling activities since no other vessels were observed in the area at the times of the breaks. There was also good
reason to believe that the breaks had been caused either by wilful or
culpably negligent action since one of the breaks occurred in the late
afternoon of February 25, 1959, after the aircraft had succeeded in
dropping a note on the deck of the trawler advising it to cease trawling in the area.
After the boarding, the information obtained by inspection of the
trawler's log, as well as the production by .the master of the airdropped message and denial of responsibility, by the master, made
further inspection by the boarding party both reasonable and necessary. The n1odest inspection of the trawler's upper decks and trawling gear without deep examination of the trawler, which revealed that
of the twelve breaks in the five cables three were man-made cuts
severing the cables, confirmed the suspicions of the United States
boarding party.
11

For the complete text see supra, p. 166.
607631---61----12
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Article X of the 1884 Convention also provides that
"When the officers (of the injured state) . . . shall have reason to believe that an infraction of the measures provided
for by this Convention has been committed by a vessel other
than a vessel of war, they may require the captain or master
to ewhibit the official documents furnishing evidence of the
nationality of the said vessel." 12 (emphasis added)
Here again the language of the 1884 Convention clearly implies the
right to board the suspected vessel because there is no other way to
require the captain or master to exhibit the official documents :furnishing the evidence o:f the nationality o:f the vessel, other than requesting
the captain to leave his ship and go aboard the inspecting ship. Nothing in the Convention or in internationalla w would permit the inspecting ship to make such a request under the circumstances o:f the case.
Thus, a visit by a boarding party o:f the inspecting ship to the trawler
would be the only way to exercise the right granted to the inspecting
ship under Article X. It should also be noted that Article X requires
the boarding officer to make "summary mention o:f such exhibition . . .
at once . . . on the documents exhibited," 13 an action which in most
instances could only take place with the documents at hand and on
board the suspected vessel.
Thus, it 1nay be concluded that under the 1884 Convention :for the
Protection o:f Submarine Cables, the United States had a right to
board and inspect the Soviet tra wier in the manner in which it was
done, the boarding party having conformed to all requirements o:f the
Convention.
Q. 2. I:£ a state has the right to board and inspect a :foreign vessel
on the high seas when that vessel is thought to be guilty o:f damaging
t he cables either by intentional or culpably negligent action, does the
right exist,
(a) Because both states are parties to the Convention :for the
Protection o:f Submarine Cables ( 1884) ; or
(b) Because customary internationalla w has developed from the
1884 Convention and/or :from general state practice so that the right
o:f the aggrieved state (and the corollary duty o:f the injuring state)
would exist even though one (or both) o:f the states was not a party to
the 1884 Convention; or
(c) Because the states are parties to the 1958 Geneva Convention
on the High Seas ?
12

Ibid.
lbi d.

13
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As indicated in the discussion of Question # 1, the right of a state
to board and inspect a vessel on the high seas is clearly implied by
Article X of the 1884 Convention. Since both the United States and
the Soviet Union are parties to that Convention they are accorded the
rights and are subjected to the obligations thereof.
Of course, it might be argued that the present Soviet Government
is a successor government to Czarist Russia which signed the 1884
Convention and is therefore not bound by the Convention. However,
this line of argument is without foundation for three reasons: First,
the general rule in international law is that a change in the form of
government of a state, or a change from one ruler or one administration to another, does not terminate or modify its treaties. 14 Lauterpacht-Oppenheim have written,
"As treaties are binding upon the contracting States changes
in the Government, or even in the form of government, of one
of the parties can, as a rule, have no influence whatever upon
the binding force of treaties." 15
Second, in the present instance the Soviet Government failed to
deny the applicability of the 1884 Convention, after the United States
had invoked it in the Aide Memoire of February 28, 1959 and in the
Note of March 23, 1959, as the basis for the claim of rights against
the Soviet Government. The United States referred in the Aide
Memoire to the 1884 Convention, "to which the Soviet Union and the
United States are parties." 16 In the March 23 note the United States
alluded to the 1884 Convention, "to which both the United States
and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics adhere." 17 It seems
logical to assume that if the Soviet Union had not felt bound by the
1884 Convention she would have said so and dropped the matter there
14

Bishop, International Law 166 (1953); 5 Hackworth, International Law
360 (1940-1944); Harvard Research in International Law, Treaties, 29 A.J.I.L.
Supp. 1044 (1935). "Unless otherwise provided in the treaty itself, the obligations of a State under a treaty are not affected by any change in its government
organization or its constitutional system." (Ibid., at Art. 24.).
Since the Soviet Government is charged here as the injuring state, it is important to note that at times that state has asserted' its freedom from certain
treaties concluded by prior Russian Governments, but appears to recognize the
continuing validity as to the Soviet Union of other pre-Soviet Russian treaties.
See Harvard Research, op. cit., 1052-54; Hazard, "The Soviet Union and International Law," 43 Illinois Law Review 591,594 (1948).
15
I Lauterpacht-Oppenheim, International Law 925 (8th ed. 1957).
16
See text supra, Ch. V, p. 165.
17
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instead of claiming variously (a) that the Soviet trawler did not
damage the cables, (b) there was no way of telling whether the Soviet
tra-vvler damaged the cable because other fishing vessels were in the
area at the time and had previously damaged the cables, and (c) that
the real purpose of the United States action and the press accounts
thereof was a sheer fabrication to provoke the Soviet Union.
Third, the most conclusive reason why the Soviet Government could
not avoid responsibility under the 1884 Convention by claiming that
it was signed by a predecessor government, long antedating the present government, is that the Soviet Union has in fact adhered to the
Convention.18
Although not too important in our actual case because of the right
of the United States to board and inspect the Soviet trawler under
the 1884 Convention, the next question is worthy of serious consideration: Whether the right of a state to board and inspect a foreign vessel
exists because customary international law has developed from the
1884 Convention and/or from general state practice so that the right
of the aggrieved state (and the corollary duty of the injuring state)
would exist even though one (or both) of the states was not a party
to the 1884 Convention~
Normally a treaty binds only the parties thereto under the principle pacta tertiis nee nocent nee prosunt. Hence, third parties
generally do not have rights (or duties) under a treaty, unless, of
course, the treaty expressly creates rights in third parties. 19
However, it is possible for rights and duties to exist under a treaty
for non-signatory parties thereto in at least four ways:
(1) If the treaty codifies customary international law, it is binding
upon non-signatory states. Of course, it might be argued that the
norm or law which binds the non-signatory states in this instance is
not the treaty but the customary international law apart from the
treaty. However, the binding force of principles and rules of customary jnternational law which have been codified is generally
greater than in the absence of such codification.
(2) Even though a state does not sign or ratify a treaty, it may accede to the provisions thereof later and hence be bound.
18

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is listed as a "party" to this
Convention in Treatie8 in Force (U.S. Department of State, Office of the Legal
Adviser, 1959), p. 250. According to Slusser and Triska, A Calendar of Soviet
Treatie8, 1917-1957, 55 (19,59 "Soviet adherence" is based on a decree of
February 2, 1926 and was implemented, concerning internal legislation, by
decree of March 5, 1926.
19
I Lauterpacht-Oppenheim, op. cit., footnote 15 (at 925-929 (and citations
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( 3) Even though a state has not ratified or acceded to a treaty, it
1nay agree in a particular case or controversy to be bound by the obligations i1nposed on signatory states under the treaty, and, in certain
instances, it may invoke the rights a treaty accorded to signatory
states. 20
( 4) Finally, when a treaty is signed and ratified by a number of
states and is operative for a long period of time, without objections by
non-signatory states to its provisions it may come to represent customary international law even though it was not a codification of
customary internationallaw at the time of its adoption.
It is the last situation above which is applicable to the question
here. The 1884 Convention has been ratified by most of the important maritime states of the world 21 and it has been operative for
more than 70 years. Therefore, it seems reasonable to argue that,
although this Convention did not represent a codification of customary international law in 1884, in the absence of objections by nonsignatory states, a customary law has now developed which accords
rights to, and imposes obligations upon, all states in the world
community in line with those expressed in the Convention.
Moreover, apart from the long history of state practice under the
1884 Convention, the crucial need for rapid communication in this
interdependent world is such that the right of a cable state to lay,
operate, and maintain submarine cables (including in exceptional
cases the right to board and inspect foreign vessels thought to have
damaged the cables by willful or culpably negligent action) is a
basic right of all states in the world community.
We must now consider the question of whether the right of the
United States to board the Soviet trawler in the present case would
exist if both states had ratified the 1958 Convention on the High Seas.
An analysis of Articles 26 to 29, inclusive, of the 1958 Convention
indicates that while they do not include an express provision for the
obtaining of evidence by the injured state as is provided in Article X
of the 1884 Convention, implying the right under unusual circum20

For example, the United Nations charter confer:s upon non-member states
a number of rights. Under Article 32 non-member states have the right to
participate in the discussion of disputes in which they are involved; under
Article 35 they have the right to bring such disputes to the attention of the
Security Council or the General Assembly; and under Article 50 non-member
states have the right to consult the Security Council with respect to the solution of special economic problems arising from the application of preventive or
enforcement measures. Jimenez de Arechaga, "Treaty Stipulations in ]..,avor
of Third States," 50 A.J'.I.L. 338 (1956) ; 2 Hyde, International Law 1466,
(2nd Rev. Ed., 1945).
/
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Treaties in Force, Dept. of State 262 (1960).
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stances such as in the present case of the cable state to board and
inspect the foreign vessel reasonably 'thought to have caused the
damage by willful or culpably negligent action, the right of a state
whose cables have been damaged to obtain evidence is a necessary
requisite to the performance of its obligations under the 1958
Convention.
Briefly, Articles 26 and 29 of the 1958 Convention accord the state
certain rights (for which other states have corollary. duties). The
former provides the express right to lay cables which, of course,
carries with it the right to take whatever reasonable measures are
necessary to operate and maintain the cables with due regard to the
rights of other states to use the high seas. The latter (i.e., Art. 29)
gives the state the right to recover the cost of lost fishing gear which
has been sacrificed to avoid injuring a submarine cable (or pipeline).
Articles 27 and 28 of the 1958 Convention impose certain duties
(for which other states have corollary rights). Article 27 imposes
the duty to legislate in. order to make damage to cables by wilful
or culpably negligent action a punishable offense. It should be noted
at this point that the 1958 Convention, unlike the 1884 Convention,
does not provide for a civil action for damages in addition to the
punishment. However, despite this omission from the 1958 Convention, the general principles of international law with respect to state
responsibility for damage to property of nationals of foreign states
resulting from actions which a,r e willful or culpably negligent would
accord to the injured state the right to recover for such damage.
Article 28 imposes the duty upon a state to see that if its cable
owners break or damage the cables of another owner (presumably
either domestic or foreign), the injuring party shall bear the cost
of the repairs. If this article had been broadened to include every
person subject to the state's jurisdiction, rather than just cable owners,
it would have been a much better provision. However, a fair interpretation of Article 28 as it is worded suggests that if a cable owner
who damages another owner's cable must pay the cost of repairs, the
same would apply to ship owners who damage a cable.
The main thrust of the first argument for contending that a state
whose cables have been damaged ma.y, under unusual circumstances
such as those of the present case, board and inspect the vessel reasonably thought to be guilty of willful or culpably negligent action in
breaking the cables is that each party to the 1958 Convention assumes
certain duties to all other parties to take legislative action, the import of which is to see that its own and other state's cables may be
laid, operated and maintained free from damage, or with recovery
for damage if it occurs in a willful or culpably negligent manner.
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The determination of the identity of the possible offender and the
'villfulness or culpability of the action requires the securing of all
possible evidence both by the injured and the injuring states. For
the most part this evidence will have to be gathered by the injured
state since it is the one which will demand of the other state the
three things which the United States demanded of the Soviet Union
under the 1884 Convention, namely, (a.) punishment of the offending
party, (b) reservation of the right to make claims for damages, and
(c) a request that 'the injuring state take effective measures to prevent
further damage. 22
An even more compelling argument in favor of the conclusion that
the United States would have the right under the 1958 Convention
on the High Seas (if it were operative) to board and inspect the
Soviet trawler under the facts of the case is that this Convention is
a codification of international law relating to the high seas and that
the provisions are "generally declaratory of established princi pies
of international law." 23 Thus, in line with our previous arguments,
since the 1884 Convention has developed into widely-practiced, customary international law relative to the right to lay, operate and
maintain submarine cables, the rights and duties of all states as
enunciated in the 1884 Convention and established through more than
70 years of state practice are codified by the 1958 Convention.
It is vital, of course, that ships of all states sailing the high seas
be kept free from indiscriminate boarding and inspection by a foreign
vessel. Some feel so strongly on this point that they have contended
that the right to board and inspect is non-existent in times o:f peace
with the exception of cases of suspected piracy. 24 However, the
better view is that under unusual circumstances, such as those of the
present case, an injured state may board and inspect a foreign vessel,
other than a foreign warship, in order to gather evidence necessary
for the fulfillment of its obligations and as a requisite to the full
achievement of its rights under treaties and customary international
law. 25
22

See text, supra, p. 166.
Preamble to Convention on the High Seas. See Appendix B.
24
II Moore, Digest of International Law 892 (1906) ; I Fauchille, Traite de
Droit International66 (1922).
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Article 22 of the Convention on the High Seas makes provision for a warship
of one state to board a foreign merchant ship on the high seas under "powers
conferred by treaty," such as those implied in Article .X of the 1884 Convention.
However, the rest of that article imposes strict limitations against boarding
foreign merchant vessels on the high seas. Article 22 (1) provides:
1. Except where acts of interference derive from powers conferred by treaty,
a warship which encounters a foreign merchant ship on the high seas is not
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One final question: Does the 1884 Convention, customary international law, or the 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas give the
right to an injured state to board a foreign war vessel, a foreign merchant or fishing vessel which is publicly owned or operated, or only a
foreign merchant or fishing vessel which is privately o·wned?
It is clear that nothing in the 1884 Convention or in customary internationallaw gives one state the right to board and inspect a foreign
war vessel. Moreover, under Article 8 of the Convention on the High
Seas, 'vhich, as previously indicated, codifies established principles of
international law, "warships on the high seas have complete immunity
from the jurisdiction of any State other than the flag State." 26
Therefore, if the Soviet tra "\V ler had been a warship as defined in the
Convention 27 it could not have been boarded and inspected by the
United States under any circumstances.
The real question, therefore, is whether the right to board and inspect a foreign vessel under circumstances such as those in this case is
limited to privately O"\vned vessels or may be invoked even though the
vessel is owned or operated by the state.
The law as to the status of state-owned or operated vessels used for
commercial purposes is not settled, although the trend in recent years
in many states is to consider such vessels on the same basis as privately
owned vessels. 28
Despite considerable opposition by the Soviet bloc at the 1958 Con:ference, the Convention on the High Seas as finally drafted contains a
provision which puts state-owned or operated vessels used :for commercial purposes on the same basis as privately owned vessels. Article
9 provides,
"Ships owned or operated by a State and used only on government non-commercial service shall, on the high seas, have
complete immunity :from the jurisdiction of any State other
than the flag State." 29
The above provision implies that i:f the state-owned or operated
vessel is used for commercial purposes (i.e., transportation, fishing,
justified in boarding her unless there is reasonable ground for suspecting:
(a) '.rhat the ship is engaged in piracy ; or
(b) That the ship is engaged in the slave trade; or
(c) That, though flying a foreign flag or refusing the show its flag, the
ship is, in reality, of the same nationality as the warship. (See Appendix B
for full text of the Convention on the High Seas.)
26
Appendix B, Art. 8 ( 1).
27
Ibid., at Art. 8 (2).
28
Bishop, op. cit., footnote 14 (at 421). In recent treaties the United States
has included a provision which puts state-owned vessels in the same class with
privately -owned vessels.
29
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177
etc.) it is not immune on the high seas from the jurisdiction of states
other than the flag state. Therefore, absent any limitation on this
provision, the United States could have boarded and inspected the Soviet trawler under Article 9 in view of the special circumstances of
the case.
However, Article 9 is not :free from a lilnitation in so far as the
Soviet Union is concerned because, in signing the Convention on the
High Seas, she filed a reservation to this particular article, as follows:
"The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics considers that the principle of international law according to which a ship on the high seas is not subject to any jurisdiction except that of the flag State applies without restriction to all govern1nent ships."
Because o£ the fact that a state is generally not bound by any provision of a treaty or convention to which she files a reservation, the
Soviet Union would appear to have some basis for protesting the
boarding and inspection of her trawler by the United States under the
1958 Convention on the High Seas, assuming, of course, that the Convention were operative as a result of ratification by the requisite 22
states, including the United States and the U.S.S.R.
One possible argument for holding the boarding and inspection of
the Soviet trawler by the United States valid under the provisions of
the 1958 Convention on the High Seas despite the Soviet reservation to
Article 9 would be that the general practice of states in treating publicly owned or operated vessels on the sa1ne basis as privately owned
vessels used for commercial purposes is sufficiently widespread to have
established customary international law binding upon all states of the
world community. Under this line of argument Article 9 of the Convention would be considered as a codification of existing international
law which would be binding upon all states regardless of any reservations to this article. 30
It may be concluded with respect to the entire case that the United
States had a right to board and inspect the Soviet trawler even though
she may have been a publicly owned or operated vessel.
The right of the United States existed primarily because both
states are parties to the Convention for the Protection of Submarine
Cables (1884). In addition, the conclusion appears justified that the
right existed also because customary internationalla\v relative to sub30

This argument is worthy of serious consideration because the Convention on
the I-Iigh Seas does not contain a provision for a state to make reservations to
any of the articles or sections thereof whereas the Convention on the Continental Shelf, adopted at the same time, does contain s~ch a provision. Art. 12 of
Convention on the Continental Shelf. Appendix D.
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marine cables has developed :from the 1884 Convention and from
general state practice so that the United States could have boarded the
trawler under the special circumstances of the case even though the
United States and/or the Soviet Union had not been parties to the
1884 Convention.
Finally, there appears to be a strong basis for concluding that the
right would exist under the 1958 Geneva Convention on the High
Seas (assuming the Convention had been operative at the time of the
incident, with both the United States and the Soviet Union as contracting parties) because the 1958 Convention constitutes a codification of international law which has become well established relative
to laying, operating and maintaining submarine cables.
B. PROBLEM 2: Exclusion of a Foreign Ship From Nuclear Test·
ing Area

FACTS: Members of the Peace Association in State A raised
money to build and operate a small ship named The Peace Mission
for the widely-announced purpose of navigating into State A's
nuclear testing area on the high seas in a dramatic attempt to rally
public opinion behind an effort on the part of scientists, religious
leaders, and others to persuade State A to halt the tests.
The Peace Mission, registered under the flag of State A, was
warned not to proceed with plans to navigate into the test area during
a designated 30-day period when the next tests were to be conducted
by State A. All states of the world had been informed of the location of the test area and the dates of the next tests by Notices to
Mariners. The notices contained the following provision, among
others: "All surface vessels of all states are prohibited from entering the test area during the test period."
Within the test area were several islands all of which were under
the sovereignty of State A. The tests could not be conducted on
State A's territory because of the density of its population.
Despite the warning, backers of The Peace Mission were adamant,
announcing publicly that they intended to navigate into the test area.
Shortly thereafter the Atomic Energy Commission of State A issued
a regulation making it a crime for vessels or civilians of State A to
enter the test area during the test period. Nothing was said in the
regulation regarding foreign vessels.
Although· officials of 'l'he Peace Association thought that the
administrative regulation of the Atomic Energy Commission was
unconstitutional, they decided to transfer the registration of The
Peace Mission to State X, a state which had enjoyed a great increase
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in ship registrations for several years because o£ "favorable" labor
laws and low registration :fees.
Flying the flag o£ State X, with officers and crew made up predominantly o£ citizens o£ State A, but with a few crew members from
States X andY, The Peace Mission sailed toward the test area, af~er
stopping :for refueling at an island under the flag o£ State A. While
on the high seas some ditsance from the test area and just a few days
prior to the start o£ the tests, The Peace Mission was overtaken by a
coast guard cutter o£ State A which had pursued her :from the island
refueling port. The Peace Mission had slipped out o£ the island port
without getting clearance to leave, after State A's officials had refused to grant her permission to depart for the purpose o£ sailing
into the test area.
The Peace Mission was well out to sea before her escape was
detected. After several hours o£ pursuit the coast guard cutter o£
State A overtook The Peace Mission and :forced her to turn back to
State A's island port, where she was detained until after completion
o£ the nuclear tests and fined for having left the port without proper
clearance.
The government o£ State X protested to the government o£ State
A that the action o£ the cutter was a violation o£ international law.
The major international law questions involved in this hypothetical
problem situation are these:
1. Whether a state has the right to designate an area o£ the high
seas for nuclear tests (or for missile, rocket, or other tests) during a
limited period o£ time, and, i£ so, what responsibilities the testing
state has to insure a minimum o£ interference with other users in the
test area and surrounding areas o£ the high seas~
2. Assuming that a state has the right to designate an area o£ the
high seas for nuclear, missile, or other tests, whether the testing state
may merely notify other states that it is a "danger area" from which
all other users are cautioned to stay away during the test period, or
whether the testing state may prohibit all other users from entering
or otherwise using the test area during the test period~
3. To what extent may a testing state exercise jurisdiction over a
foreign vessel on the high seas when the flag .o£ the foreign state is
essentially a "flag o£ convenience" without any "genuine link between
the state and the ship" as required under Article 5 ( 1) o£ the 1958
Geneva Convention on the I-Iigh Seas~ 31
Q. I: Whether a state has the right to designate an area o£ the
high seas for nuclear tests (or for missile, rocket, or other tests) during a limited period o£ time, and, i£ so, what responsibilities the
31
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testing state has to insure a minimum of interference with other users
in the test area and surrounding areas of the high seas?
Although the legal right of a state to designate an area of the high
seas for nuclear, missile, rocket or other tests is now widely recognized
as a valid use of the high seas, a number of thoughtful persons oppose
the continuation of the tests, particularly atomic and thermonuclear
tests on the ground that they are legally and morally wrong. The
moral arguments against such tests are (a) that the world cannot
achieve peace if states continue to develop increasingly devastating
weapons of destruction which are rapidly approaching the point of
guaranteed annihilation; (b) that even though such horrible weapons
are never used, the mere testing has an adverse genetic effect upon the
human race because of the harmful fallout; and (c) that the sheer
waste of human and physical resources in the entire armaments race,
of which nuclear and missile testing is such a costly part, is Inorally
indefensible.
The legal arguments against using any part of the high seas for
nuclear tests were rather well summarized by Margolis in 1955 32 in
commenting upon the hydrogen bomb tests conducted by the United
States in a 400,000 square mile area enco1npassing a number of islands
held under a strategic Trusteeship Agreement with the United N ations. Th1argolis argued that the establishment of a vast "\varning area .
cannot be reconciled with "the internationallaw princi pie of freedom
of the seas and its attendant corollaries, freedom of navigation (of
both the sea and the air), and freedom from interference with the
lawful pursuit of maritime industries (fishing, transport, etc.)." 33
In addition to arguing that the tests 'vere a violation of freedom of
the seas, Margolis also claimed that they also violated both the United
Nations Charter and the Trusteeship Agreement for the former
32

Margolis, "The Hydrogen Bomb Tests and International Law," 64 Yale Law
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Ibid., at 630, 635. Also see Margolis, "The Legality of H-Bomb Tests," The
Nation 570 (Dec. 31, 1955) in whic.h he invokes both legal and moral arguments,
saying, "Arguments of expediency couched in terms of defending the free world
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J owitt in the House of Lords: "I am entirely satisfied that the United States, in
conducting these experiments, have taken every possible step open to them to
avoid any possible danger. But the fact that the area which may be affected
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law, I presume, to warn people off." 186 H.L. Deb. 808-09 (5th Ser.1954).
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Japanese Mandated Islands and caused an illegal pollution of the
high seas and the air space.
On the other hand, the legal arguments for the right of a state to
conduct the nuclear tests have been effectively marshalled by
McDougal and Schlei, in answer to the Margolis thesis. 34
While the claim of a State to use a designated area of the high seas
for nuclear weapons testing is relatively recent and unprecedented, for
the obvious reason that science and technology did not create such
weapons until1945, this new, emergent use of the high seas is a reasonable one. It is reasonable because it is a necessary requisite of selfdefense. As McDougal has rightly concluded,
"The claim of the United States is in substance a claim to
prepare for self-defense. . . . It has not been possible to
establish, under the United Nations or otherwise, either effective international control of armaments or commitments and
procedures of global scope which offer reasonable assurance
against aggression. . . . The United States has undertaken
its program of atomic and thermonuclear weapons development to ensure that these free nations are not lacking either
in the retaliatory power w~ich may deter aggression or in the
weapons of self -defense if deterrence fails. In this posture
of world organization and crisis, which puts so high a premium on self-defense, with authorization of potentially the
most drastic interferences with others, it cannot, we suggest,
be reasonably concluded that it is unreasonable for the United
States to engage in such temporary and limited interferences
with navigation and fishing as are involved in the hydrogen
bomb tests, in preparation for the defense of itself and its
allies and of all the values of a free world society." 35
Certainly the objective of defending all the values of a free world
society is as important as, and indeed includes, the traditional uses
of the high seas for navigation, fishing, cable laying, etc. Security is
the keystone in the arch of all free world values and to be secure the
United States and her allies must continue to test and perfect every
type of defense weapon even though, it is to be hoped, these weapons
never have to be used in defense of the Free World.
The Soviet Government has attempted to distinguish between designating an area of the high seas for nuclear weapons testing and rocket
or missile testing. At the 1958 Geneva Conference the Soviet bloc
34
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tried desperately but without success to have inserted into the Convention on the High Seas a new succinctly-worded article: "States
are bound to refrain from testing nuclear weapons on the high seas.." 36
Yet, despite her vociferous objections to nuclear test areas on the
high seas, the Soviet Government felt no hesitancy recently (January
7, 1960) in designating a fairly large area of the Pacific about 1,000
miles east of the Marshall Islands for some rocket tests, with the following announcement :
"On the basis of the progress made by the Soviet Union in
the exploration of cosmic space with the help of ballistic
rockets, and in conformity with their research program,
Soviet scientists and designers a.r e now working to develop
a more powerful rocket to launch heavy earth satellites and
undertake space flights to planets of the solar system.
"With a view to perfecting this rocket with a high accuracy
of flight, its launchings 'vithout the last stage will be made
within the coming months of 1960 into the central part of the
Pacific Ocean, removed from places of intensive shipping,
airlines and fisheries.
"The penultimate stage of the rocket is expected to fall
within the area with the following coordinates:
"Latitude: 9.6 degrees north, 10.22 degrees north, 6.16 degrees north, 5.3 degrees north.
"Longitude: 170.47 degrees west, 168.22 degrees west, 166.16
degrees west, 168.40 degrees west.
"Special ships of the Soviet fleet will be dispatched to this
area to carry out the necessary rneasurements.
"This first launchings of rockets will be undertaken somewhere between Jan. 15 and Feb. 15, 1960.
"To insure the safety of navigation and air traffic during
the launching of rockets into the Central Pacific, Tass is
authorized to announce that the Government of the Soviet
Union asks the governments of the nations whose ships or
aircraft may find themselves during this period in the vicinity of the area where the rockets might fall to see that the
authorities concerned instruct the ship masters and aircraft
36
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unsuccessful in getting the insertion of a provision banning naval or air ranges,
as follows: "No naval or air ranges or other combat training areas limiting
freedom of navigation may be designated on the high seas near foreign coasts
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captains to refrain from entering the aquatorium [water]
area and airspace of the Pacific designated by the above mentioned coordinates." 37
Basically there is no distinction between designating an area of
the high seas for atomic tests, thermonuclear tests, missile tests,
rocket tests, or any other similar tests. In all cases the claim of
right to use an area of the high seas for such purposes constitutes the equivalent of an exclusive use of the area by the
testing state for a limited period of time, even though the claimant
state nevers demands an exclusive use. The reason why the designation of the area constitutes an exclusive use by the testing state is
clear: the danger to navigation, fishing, scientific research, cable laying, and other uses of the designated area during the testing period
is such that all states other than the State conducting the tests will,
as a rule, stay clear of the area.
It may be concluded that states have the right to designate limited
areas of the high seas for the testing of atomic and thermonuclear
weapons, missiles, rockets, etc., provided the testing program is reasonable. Whether it is reasonable depends upon a number of factors,
among which are:
(1) There must be an actual, verifiable need to use the high seas
as the test area. If the State has adequate land mass areas of its
own for conducting the tests, or can enter into agreements with
other states to use their land mass areas, the high seas which constitute a common resource of all states shall not be used.
(2) Adequate advance notice must he given to all states by the testing state as to the type of tests to be conducted, the period of time
for the tests, and an accurate designation of the test area.
(3) The area selected must be in relatively isolated parts of the
high seas little used for navigation, fishing, and other uses.
(4) The size of the testing area must be kept to the absolute minimum consistent with the safety of other concurrent users of the
general area of the high seas.
( 5) The period during which the tests are to be conducted must
be kept as short as possible in order that interference with other
users of the area will be minimized.
(6) Every precaution must be taken to insure that any tests (i.e.,
atomic and thermonuclear) which may have lingering after effects
upon the conclusion thereof should not result in substantial and continued deprivation of other uses in the test area or in surrounding
areas.
87
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(7) At present it appears that the testing state will be responsible
for the payment of damages for any injury to persons or property of
foreign states outside of the designated test area. The liability upon
the testing state shall be absolute because of the hazardous nature of
the testing activity; a showing of willful or negligent injury shall be
unnecessary.
Notwithstanding the conclusion that states have the right to designate limited areas of the high seas for the testing of weapons and
scientific devices whenever the absence of available land mass territory necessitates the use of such areas of the high seas, it should
be noted that the 1958 Geneva Conference passed a resolution which
recognized "that there is- a serious and genuine apprehension on the
part of many States that nuclear explosions constitute an infringement of the freedom of the seas," 38 and referred the matter to the
General Assembly of the United Nations for appropriate action.
Proposed by India, the resolution was approved in the Second Committee by a vote of 51 to one, with 14 abstentions,39 and by the plenary
meetings by a vote of 58 to none, with 13 abstentions. 40
Members of the Soviet bloc were the principal abstainers. The reason given by Tunkin of the U.S.S.R. was that his delegation believed
that the Conference should deal with the question of nuclear tests and
should adopt a positive rule to prohibit such tests in that they constituted a violation of the principle of freedom of the high seas. 41 Of
course, Tunkin could not know in March of 1958 that in January
of 1960 his government would take the opposite view in designating
a large area of the high seas for rocket tests thereby effectively
eliminating the free use of those high seas by other states during a
specified period.
In voting for the Indian resolution to refer the matter of nuclear
testing to the General Assembly, and against the Soviet bloc proposal
to add a new article which would have prohibited entirely the testing of nuclear weapons on the high seas, Dean, chairman of the
United States delegation, pointed out that his government was not
opposed to the prohibition of nuclear tests provided it was accompanied by effective international control. However, he reminded the
tenth plenary meeting that unfortunately, owing to the attitude of
the Soviet Union Government, no agreement had so far been possible
38
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and he expressed regret that the Soviet Union had boycotted the Disarmament Commission of the United N ations. 42
At first glance it appears that the expression in the 1958 Geneva
Resolution of "a serious and genuine apprehension on the part of
many States that nuclear explosions constitute an infringement of
the freedom of the seas," negates the conclusion we reached above that
states do have the right to designate areas of the high seas for various
tests, provided land mass territory is not available. However the
resolution does not negate our conclusion. As the United Kingdom
delegate pointed out in the Second Committee, the Indian-sponsored
resolution to the effect that apprehension about nuclear tests was a
fact, did not indicate how many states had such apprehensions, or
whether they were justified.43
Moreover, as Sen of India made abundantly clear in the Second
Committee, his government was in favor of a complete cessation of
all nuclear explosions, whether conducted on land or on the high
seas, because such tests were a crime against humanity and nuclear
energy should not be used for destruction. Finally, it is clear that
the main purpose of the Indian-sponsored resolution was not to condemn nuclear testing on the high seas apart from nuclear testing on
land, nor to place a prohibition on the continuation of such tests, as
the Soviet bloc proposal would have done had it passed but rather
to refer the matter to the General Assembly as the best possible way
to resolve the entire problem of disarmament, of which nuclear testing
on the high seas is but a part.
Therefore, it may be concluded that the record of the 1958 Geneva
Conference affirms rather than denies the right of states to continue
designating areas of the high seas for nuclear and other tests (a)
provided the tests are reasonable in terms of the requirements set
forth above and (b) until such time as the United Nations can
devise satisfactory controls and inspection systems in connection with
total disarmament in the world community to make unnecessary the
continuation of large-scale weapons testing on the high seas by the
United States and her allies in order to insure the defense of all
the values of a free world society.
One final point should be made. While it may be true, as someone
once remarked, that petty consistency is the hallmark of little minds,
it would appear to be unjustifiably inconsistent to contend, as the
Soviet government has done, that the designation by the United States
of an area of the high seas for nuclear weapons testing is an illegal
violation of the freedom of the high seas, \vhereas it is valid for the
42
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U.S.S.R. to claim the right not only to establish a rocket test area
(see above), but also the right to conduct naval maneuvers and conventional weapons testing in a designated area o:f the Arctic and
warn vessels not to use the area during a specified period. 44
It is submitted that a state may legally designate a large warning
area o:f the high seas :for nuclear missile, or rocket tests (assuming
always the non-availability o:f land mass :for such tests), just as it
may establish smaller warning areas :for conducting naval maneuvers
and weapons testing on a relatively small scale. The ultimate test in
every case is the reasonableness o:f the action as measured by the tests
indicated above.
Therefore, in the problem situation outlined, it may be concluded
that State A had the right to establish the nuclear testing area on
the high seas.
Q. 2. Assuming that a state has the right to designate an area o:f
the high seas :for nuclear, n1issile, or other tests, the next question is
whether the testing state may merely notify other states that it is
a "danger area" :from which all other users are cautioned to stay away
during the test period, or whether the testing state may prohibit all
other users from entering or otherwise using the test area during the
test period? The question may be asked in two parts: (1) May a
state exclude vessels o:f its own state? (2) May a state exclude vessels
flying the flag o:f a foreign state?
The first part o:f the over-all question posed above is a matter of
domestic rather than international law, and hence will not be discussed here beyond saying that the United States has prevented ships
registered under her flag from entering her nuclear test areas. 45 It
appears to us that the action o:f the United States was justified, otherwise it would knowingly have permitted the suicide of some wellmeaning citizens who, however noble their intentions to dramatize
the inhumanity of nuclear warfare are, fail to realize the disastrous
consequences o:f an unprepared Free World. 46 ~One purpose of a
civilized state is to protect its citizens against their own folly, whether
it be jumping off o:f high buildings, swallowing poison, or sailing into
nuclear test areas.
With respect to the second part o:f the question (i.e., the right o£ a
testing state to exclude foreign vessels), it seems clear that all any
state may do under present international law is to designate the test
area as a "danger zone'' and notify all possible users thereof to stay
44
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away during the test period. Nothing in international law or in t};le
provisions of any of the four Geneva Conventions of 1958 confers
upon a state the right to exclude foreign vessels from using an. ar~a
of the high seas which has been designated ror nuclear, missile, rocket
or other similar tests,· or even for naval maneuvers or conventional :
weapons testing.
This conclusion is not at variance with the conclusion reached in
Chapter II. There it was held that the coastal state has a right under
the 'C onvention on the Continental Shelf to establish safety zone~
around continental shelf installations, which safety zones would then
encompass what we designated as "protected high seas" from which
the coastal state under certain circumstances would have not only the
right but also the duty to exclude foreign vessels.
But the "protected high seas" within the safety zone are different
from the high seas of a designated test area. As indicated in Chapter
II, the "protected high seas" of the continnetal shelf safety zone
normally may be used by all states for navigation, fishing, scientific
investigation, etc., subject only to the condition that such use must
not unreasonably endanger or impede the exploitation of . the continental shelf resources. When the exploitation is unreasonable, endangered or impeded, as in the problem situation posed in Chapter II,
the coastal state may exclude the foreign vessels until such tiine as.
the danger or impediment is removed.
However, the "protected high seas" of the continental shelf safety
zone differ in several important respects from an area of the high
seas designated for nuclear or other tests, differences which make it
unreasonable to conclude that a testing state may prohibit foreign
vessels from entering the test area.
First, by formulating the Convention on the Continental Shelf,
the world community of states has sanctioned the creation of a safety
zone by a coastal state around continental shelf installations and in
doing so has given a special character to the high seas within the
zone. The world community has also conferred certain express rights
(and imposed certain duties) upon the coastal state with respect to
controlling those "protected high seas" in connection with the exploitation of the continental shelf resources. The rights conferred include the right to prohibit vessels from using the "protected high
seas" of the safety zone under certain extreme conditions.
By contrast, in designating a nuclear or other test area in the high
seas, no state has been so bold as to claim the right to prohibit foreign
vessels or aircraft from using such areas. 47 Nor does an international
47
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convention exist which even suggests that a state has the right to exclude foreign vessels from any area of the high seas (other than from
the continental shelf safety zone). On the contrary, the Convention
on the High Seas contains the express provision that "the high seas
being open to all nations, no State may validly purport to subject any
part of them to its sovereignty." 48
Second, the area of the "protected high seas" of the continental
shelf safety zone under present contemplation is a: relatievly small
area of the high seas as compared with the vast areas required for
nuclear and other tests. The Convention on the Continental Shelf
expressly limits the safety zone to a "distance of 500 metres around
the installations and other devices which have been erected," with the
specific requirement that "ships of all nationalities must respect these
safety zones." 49
By contrast, the areas of the high seas designated by testing states
for nuclear or other tests_may be, and usually are, large. The United
States test area for the hydrogen bomb tests covered 400,000 square
miles. The area recently designated by the Soviet Government for
rocket tests, although smaller than the United States thermonuclear
test area, was vast as compared with the contemplated safety zone
areas encompassing "protected high seas" around continental shelf
installations.
Both the limitation of the safety zone to a small area, and particularly the right which is accorded the coastal state under the Convention on the Continental Shelf to demand the respect of its safety
zone by foreign vessels give rise to the right to exclude such vessels
fron1 the safety zone if necessary. Stated another way, the right to
included the land areas of certain a tolls and the three-mile territorial sea
thereof. (Ibid., at 627.) However, in areas of the high seas the United States
has only esta.blished "danger areas." Similarly, the Soviet Government in its
recent designation of the area of the high seas for her rocket tests made no
attempt to exclude other users from the area, but only warned vessels and
a ircraft. (For the text of the Soviet announcement see, supra, p. 182.)
48
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exclude foreign vessels from the "protected high seas" of a small
safety zone is justified not only because of the provisions of the Convention but also because of the fact that such exclusion in a few
unusual cases would not greatly burden the excluded state.
On the other hand, in view of (a) the long history of the struggle
for more than three centuries to protect the freedom of the high seas,
and (b) the provision of the Convention on the High Seas which
denies the right of a state to subject any part of them to its sovereignty 50 (unless as expressly provided in any of the Conventions-e.g., the continental shelf safety zones), it w o u 1 d be
unreasonable to conclude that a state has the right to exclude foreign
vessels from any area of the high seas without world community
sanction, particularly from so large an area of the high seas as the
test areas.
Third, one notes a decided difference in the possible need for a
coastal state to exclude foreign vessels from the "protected high seas"
of the safety zone around the continental shelf installations, as contrasted with the lack of any such possible need in a designated test
area. Presently most of the continental shelf installations are permanent or semi-permanent. This being the case they cannot be moved
readily to accommodate other users (i.e., those who wish to navigate,
fish, conduct scientific research, lay cables, etc.). Hence, the coastal
state must have the ultimate right to exclude other users from the
safety zone whenever necessary in order to protect these installations
and devices used in the exploitation of the natural resources.
By contrast, a state designating an area of the high seas for conducting nuclear or other tests does not need the right to exclude
foreign vessels from the designated area in order to perform the
tests. To be sure, if foreign vessels are not excluded from a test area
they may suffer damage, but it is enough to warn them of the danger
and then leave it to them to decide whether they wish to heed the
warning or assume the risk of damage by entering the test area.
Therefore, since the need to exclude foreign vessels from the "protected high seas" of a safety zone may exist, and since there is no
need to exclude such vessels from a designated test area in the high
seas, the two types of high seas differ significantly, justifying the
right of exclusion in certain unusual instances in the case of the safety
zone, but not justifying it in the case of the designated test area.
Finally, the "protected high seas" of the safety zone differs markedly from the designated test area of the high seas in that in the
former all states have a normal expectation of continuing use of the
high seas around the continental shelf installations for navigation,
50
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fishing, and other uses while the coastal state is exploiting the continental shelf resources, whereas in the case of the designated test area
there is no normal expectation of use during the test period because
of the nature of the testing activity and, in fact, little use of the test
area at any tin1e because of its isolated location. vVhile continental
shelf installations may not be located in such a way as to interfere
with the use of "recognized sea lanes essential to international navigation," 51 they may be located near such sea lanes and a:lso in areas of
the high seas which may be excellent fishing grounds where fishing
would be conducted on a large scale by coastal and overseas fleets
concurrently with the exploitation of oil or other resources from the
continental shelf by the. coastal state.
·, On the other hand, one of the tests o£ the reasonableness of the designation of a test area by a state is that the area selected must be in an
isolated section of the high seas little used for navigation, fishing and
other purposes. The hasty conclusion which might be drawn relative
to this difference in expectation of use of the "protected high seas"
of the continental shelf safety zone as contrasted with the use of the
isolated test area of the high seas is that the former (i.e., safety zone)
should not permit of exclusion of foreign vessels because of the
possible serious burden to other users, whereas the latter test area could
permit of exclusion without serious impairment of other uses because
of little expectation of use of the isolated test areas. Yet, a more
refiecti ve consideration of the total problem, viewed from the perspective of the arguments n1arshalled above, particularly those based
upon the provision of the 1958 Convention on the High Seas which
codifies "the rules of international law relating to the high seas" 52
in denying the right of any State to exercise sovereignty over any part
of the high seas (except, of course, where other conventions ma,y
accord special rights such as in the case of the continental shelf safety
zones), leads inexorably to the conclusion that testing states may not
prohibit other states from using the vast test a.reas.
To permit the exclusion of foreign vessels from test areas could
conceivably lead to spurious claims by states to large areas of the
high seas, ostensibly for conducting nuclear, missile, rocket, or other
tests, when in fact the claims would be £or ulterior purposes inimical
to the best interests of the total values of the free world society.
Therefore, the basic, overriding princi pie of freedom of the high
seas must prevail not only in all conventions which are written,
but in the decisions which are made in various foreign offices and in
the World Court and other international tribunals. The right of
51
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one state to exclude another from any area of the high seas, even
for a limited time, must not be permitted, unless expressly authorized
by an international convention (e.g., the Convention on the Continental Shelf) and only then in extreme circumstances such as those
formulated in the problem situation in Chapter II where in imminent
danger to the continental shelf installations justified the neutral
coastal state in excluding from the "protected high seas" of the safety
zone the warships of belligerents.
Therefore, it :follows that State A could not exclude a foreign
vessel from its nuclear testing area, although presumably it would not
be liable for any damage suffered by the vessel or its personnel inside
the test area on the theory that the foreign vessel, having been
warned of the danger, assumed the risks of navigating into the
area.
But here there is a real question as to 'vhether the vessel, The
Peace Mission, is in fact a foreign vessel. It is manned by officers
and crew who were predominantly citizens of State A, and its flag
was changed to State X largely for convenience in order to a void
the possible application of the administrative regulation of the Atomic
Energy Commission which made entrance into a test area for vessels
of State A a punishable offense. This leads to the next question.
Q. 3. To what extent may a testing state exercise jurisdiction over
a foreign vessel on the high seas when the flag of the vessel is essentially a "flag of convenience" with some doubt as to the "genuine link
between the state and the ship'' as required under Article 5 ( 1) of the
1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas~
Article 5 ( 1) provides as follows :
"Each State shall fix the conditions for the grant of its nationality to ships, for the registration of ships in its territory,
and for the right to fly its flag. Ships have the nationality
of the State whose flag they are entitled to fly. There must
exist a genuine link between the State and the ship; in particular, the State must effectively exercise its jurisdiction and
control in administrative, technical and social matters over
ships flying its flag." 53 (emphasis added)
The International Law Commission had the same provision in its
final draft articles. 54 Just what constitutes a "genuine link" is nowhere defined by the Commission, nor did the 1958 Conference decide
upon any tests for determining the matter. In its commentaries on the
article, the Commission admitted that the terminology was vague and
lacked precision, saying,
53
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"The Commission does not consider it possible to state in any
greater detail what form this link should take. This lack of
precision made some members of the Commission question the
advisability of inserting such a stipulation. But the majority of the Commission preferred a vague criterion to no
criterion at all. While leaving States a wide latitude in this
respect, the Commission wished to make it clear that the
grant of its flag to a ship cannot be a mere administrative formality, with no accompanying guarantee that the ship possesses a real link with its new State." 55
At the 1958 Conference the United States and several other states,
particularly Liberia and Panama, currently ranking third and sixth,
respectively, in merchant fleet tonnage in the world, 56 opposed the
"genuine link" provision. The Liberian delegate argued that the
provision would lead to confusion, 57 and the Panamanian delegate not
only criticized the lack of precision of the language but also contended
that its use would encourage States to interfere in the internal affairs
of others. 58
On the other hand, the United Kingdom delegate said that the
article was acceptable as a statement of principle and that no attempt
should be made to define the "genuine link" in greater detail and that,
in any event, the job of definition was a specialized task for another
body with more time and greater knowledge of the issues. 59 Other
states concurred and the article was adopted.
Under the facts of our hypothetical problem it could be argued that
there is no "genuine link between the state and the ship." The reason The Peace Association changed the registration was stipulated
to be for the purpose of a voiding the application of the regulation
of the Atomic Energy Commission of State A. Moreover, the majority of the officers and crew of the vessel are citizens of State A.
Finally, The Peace Association which raised the money to build the
vessel for the specific purpose of sailing into the nuclear test area
is an association of State A.
Under the above analysis the facts seem to indicate a lack of any
"genuine link" (whatever its exact tests) between the ship and State
X, ·which brings into play another article of the Convention on the
High Seas under which the coast guard vessel of State A would
have the right to exercise jurisdiction over The Peace Mission even
55
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though she was flying the flag of State X . Article 22 ( 1) of that
Convention provides in part,
"1. Except where acts of interference derive from powers
conferred by treaty, a warship which encounters a foreign
merchant ship on the high seas is not justified in boarding
her unless there is reasonable ground for suspecting : . . .
(c) That, though flying a foreign flag or refusing to show
its flag, the ship is, in reality, of the same nationality as the
warship." 60
On the other hand, it could be argued that ownership of the vessel
and nationality of the crew are not elements of a "genuine link,"
since proposals to take these into account were rejected by the Conference. The only requisite of Article 5 ( 1) cited above is that "the
state must effectively exercise its jurisdiction and control in administrative, technical and social matters over ships flying its flag." 61
Since there is no evidence that State X did not exercise jurisdiction
and control over the vessel, The Peace Mission, the more valid conelusion is that the testing state, State A, had no right to exercise
jurisdiction over the vessel on the high seas.
60

61

Appendix B, p. 203.
U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 13/L. 53 and corr. 1 (1958).

